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Abstract
Accounting standards mandate different, more conservative, rules for the recognition
of unrealized gains than unrealized losses in reported earnings.

Conditional

conservatism, defined as asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of unrealized losses vs.
gains in reported earnings has, since its origins, been a peculiar characteristic of the
accounting system.

Understanding conservatism’s role, its determinants, and its

variations across firms is important for interpreting the nature, purposes, and valuation
implications of accounting. Basu (1995; 1997) proposed a model to detect accounting
conditional conservatism and provided empirical evidence that bad news is recognized
more quickly than good news in earnings for a sample over the period 1963-1991.
Following his seminal work 1 , accounting literature adopted the Basu single-period model
to measure conditional conservatism (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2005; Ball and
Shivakumar 2005; Lobo and Zhou 2006).
However, Basu’s proxy for measuring the arrival of good/bad news, the price of the
firm’s stock, may be influenced, in part, by factors that will never be recorded in a firm’s
reported earnings.
conservatism.

This introduces inaccuracy in the measure of conditional

To address the problems, I introduce a new measure of conditional

conservatism, which results from a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression
and adopts the number of changes in financial analysts’ EPS forecasts as a proxy for
good/bad news. Then, I use this new measure to test the determinants, suggested by
previous literature, of conditional conservatism in accounting.

Results show that

companies with (1) lower debt-to-assets ratio, (2) large proportion of executives’ annual

1

As of December 7, 2006, 102 citations for Basu (1997) are recorded on Thomson ISI’s Social Sciences
Citation Index (http://portal.isiknowledge.com) and 291 are on Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com)

v

compensation independent of the firm’s accounting performance, (3) one of the big 4/big
7 audit firms as auditor, and a auditor opinion qualified with a going concern assumption
the previous year exhibit a greater timeliness in the recognition of bad news than good
news in annual earnings.
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1. Introduction
The conservative principle, defined as the more timely recognition of unrealized
losses vs. gains in annual earnings, has characterized for centuries the practice of
accounting reporting. Despite its widespread adoption over time and over different
countries, however, the concept is somewhat counter-intuitive. Why do we have rules
mandating the prompt recognition of expected losses, but delay the recognition of gains
until they are (1) realized or realizable and (2) earned 2 ? Instead, would not a timely
recognition of all the available news be more informative to users of financial statements,
and thus preferred?

Indeed, recently the US Financial Accounting Standard Board

(FASB), jointly with the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), stated:
Neutrality is incompatible with conservatism, which implies a bias in financial
reporting information. Neutral information does not color the image it
communicates to influence behavior in a particular direction. For example,
automobiles might be produced with speedometers that indicate a higher speed than
the automobile actually is traveling at to influence drivers to obey the speed limit.
But those “conservative” speedometers would be unacceptable to drivers who
expect them to faithfully represent the speed of the automobile. Conservative or
otherwise biased financial reporting information is equally unacceptable. (FASB,
Preliminary Views, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of
Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financial
Reporting Information, July 6, 2006, No. 1260-001, p. 29)
This issue has been the basis for recent academic research (Guay 2006; Watts 2003a,
2003b; Ryan 2006; Roychowdhury and Watts 2006; LaFond and Watts 2006; Choi et al.
2006; Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006) because the
understanding of the motivations and the determinants of conditional conservatism is
important to gain insights on the role of financial reporting in debt contracting,
managerial compensation, valuation, and institutional settings. As an example, we can
consider the debt contracting situation. Shareholders have limited liability, which gives
2

FASB Concept Statement No. 5.
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them incentives to transfer a company’s wealth to themselves in the form of dividends,
leaving the company as an empty legal entity to debt-holders. To avoid this, debt
covenants link the maximum amount of dividends that can be distributed to reported
earnings. Requiring a less timely recognition of good news and more timely recognition
of bad news in the firm’s annual reported earnings guarantees the debt-holders that a
minimum level of resources is kept inside the company, and is available for distribution
in case of a firm’s liquidation.
Researchers have found evidence of conditional conservatism among US and
international companies, and have suggested that conservatism is adopted in accounting
because it benefits the agents that use, prepare, or regulate accounting reporting.
Consequently, understanding the determinants and the institutional factors that shape the
financial reporting process is fundamental to reading and interpreting a firm’s annual
financial statements, the output of this process. But many important questions remain
unanswered and more empirical issues need to be addressed.

Has the analysis of

conditional conservatism been exhaustive in identifying all the factors that might explain
its widespread adoption?

An investigation of the accuracy of the measures commonly

used in identifying the determinants of conservatism is vital in considering the reliability
of research results.
Indeed, because it is not possible to observe and track each single piece of
information about a company’s future gains and losses, researchers need to identify an
observable variable that can be adopted to indirectly measure a firm’s news to test for the
timeliness of reporting good versus bad news in annual earnings.

Accounting

researchers, following Basu’s seminal work (1997; 1995), adopted the market price of the

2

firm’s stock as a variable to measure good vs. bad news about the firm’s future earnings.
The use of this measure, however, has raised a number of economic and econometric
issues (Dietrich et al. 2006). The stock price varies, in part, due to certain factors that
will have a chance to be recognized in future earnings (accounting information).
However, stock prices may also vary due to factors that will not be recognized in
earnings over the years (non-accounting information). Thus, stock prices, despite being a
rather accurate measure of information about future cash flow, provide an inaccurate
measure of the amount and significance of current information about the firm’s
unrealized earnings that will be recognized in the future. This introduces noise in the
measure of asymmetric timeliness, hence in the measure of conditional conservatism.
Therefore, I introduce a new, a priori more precise measure of asymmetric
timeliness, combining a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression with the
number of revisions in the financial analysts’ estimates of earnings per share (EPS) as a
new variable to capture the arrival of good and bad “accounting 3 ” news about the firm’s
future earnings. Financial analysts gather all available information, but use only the part
that they believe will have a chance to be recognized in future earnings to revise their
EPS estimates. 4 (Nichols and Wahlen 2004).

This variable, I believe, is a more

reasonable proxy for the arrival of good/bad news about future earnings than returns to
investors, because it includes only the pieces of information that have a chance to be
recognized in annual earnings over the years. This variable should help to measure more

3

In the sense that these pieces of information will be, over time, recognized in the firm’s annual earnings.
I adopt here the three theoretical links between earnings the three theoretical links between earnings and
share prices developed by Beaver (1998): current period earnings provides information to predict future
periods’ earnings, which provide information to forecast dividends in future periods, which provide
information to determine stock prices, equal to the present value of future dividends.
4

3

precisely whether there is a difference in how quickly good and bad news are reported in
annual earnings, hence the presence and the strength of conditional conservatism.
Once I demonstrate that this measure of asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of
good/bad news about future earnings is, a priori, less noisy (thus more precise), I can test
whether determinants suggested by previous literature-, managerial, debt contracting, and
auditor’s choice-are still able to explain the reasons for conditional conservatism. I test
(1) whether companies with a higher debt-to-asset ratio, where bondholders detain more
power, are characterized by higher conditional conservatism. Next, I test (2) whether
companies in which executives’ compensation is more heavily based on firms’
accounting performances are characterized by higher conditional conservatism. Finally, I
test (3) if there is an association between auditors, auditor opinions, and the company’s
lagged conditional conservatism.
The results of the dissertation show that (1) companies characterized by a high debtto-asset ratio, contrary to expectations, recognize good news about future earnings as
quickly as bad news. These companies, which are closer to default in debt provisions
than companies with low leverage ratio, are more likely to take higher risks and
“manage” earnings through a relatively faster recognition of expected gains (good news),
in order to reduce the chances of not meeting the requirements of debt indentures, thus
reducing the asymmetric timeliness that I find for the rest of the sample. Second,
companies with executives compensated more heavily based on the company’s
accounting performances do consistently exhibit, contrary to what I expected based on
previous literature, aggressive accounting, defined as expected gains recognized in annual
earnings faster than losses. This might provide evidence of the relative power of the

4

firm’s executives (who have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to increase an
annual compensation package based on the firm’s accounting performance) over
shareholders, who have incentives to enforce conservative accounting to reduce the
chances of overpaying the firm’s management. Additionally (3), companies that in the
previous year were audited by one of the big 4/big 7 audit firms and that received an
unqualified auditor opinion without explanatory language show a more conditional
conservative behavior than the rest of the sample. Finally, over a reduced sample of
6,282 firm-year observations, I find that companies receiving an auditors’ opinion
qualified with the going concern assumption had been aggressive in the year prior to the
going concern opinion but become highly conservative in the year of the opinion and the
year following. Significantly, during the year of the going concern opinion and the
following year, these firms exhibit a higher conditional conservative behavior than other
firms in the sample with clear auditors’ opinions.
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature that analyzes
conservative accounting and justifies the new proxy used to capture good/bad news.
Chapter 3 describes the model and the hypotheses tested in the dissertation. Chapter 4
provides a short description of the sample and details its descriptive statistics. Chapter 5
outlines the research design and provides results. Chapter 6 performs some sensitivity
analyses. Chapter 7 concludes and points to future avenues for research.

5

2. Conditional Conservatism in Accounting
2.1 Conservatism Determinants
Previous literature, summarized in Watts (LaFond and Watts 2006; Watts 2003a,
2003b; Ball et al. 2005), suggests five alternative explanations for conservatism in
financial reporting. The first explanation is its use as efficient technology employed in
firm governance. A conservative accounting approach is used to deal with the moral
hazard determined by the asymmetric information, limited liability, and asymmetric
payoffs of the different parties involved in the firms, e.g. management compensation and
debt contracts. Watts argues that contracting is a likely reason for the start of both
accounting and conservatism, and that “conservatism constrains managerial opportunistic
behavior and offsets managerial biases with its asymmetrical verifiability requirement”
(2003a).

The second possible explanation for accounting conservatism is limiting

shareholders’ litigation. Overstating a firm’s net assets is more likely to increase the
litigation costs for the firm than understating net assets. Thus, with conservatism, the
firm reduces its expected litigation costs. The third possible explanation is taxation; in
profitable firms, conservatism reduces the present value of taxes 5 , thus increasing the
value of the firm. The fourth possible explanation of conservatism in financial reporting
is standard setters’ and regulators’ incentives. Both standard setters and regulators are
exposed to asymmetric loss functions because they would be more criticized if they adopt
accounting standards that favor overstatement of net assets instead of understatement of
net assets.

Finally, the fifth reason for conservatism in financial accounting is

theoretically introduced and empirically tested recently by LaFond and Watts (2006); the
different information sets between informed and uninformed investors create incentives
5

Deferring revenues recognition and accelerating expenses recognition.
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for the firm’s shareholders to adopt conservative accounting reporting. They argue that
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors creates agency costs,
thus reducing the firm’s expected future cash flow and increasing the equilibrium rate of
return required by investors.

Both effects reduce the firm’s value; therefore,

conservatism is a corporate governance mechanism used to mitigate the value reduction
effect of the information asymmetry. The commonalities of these five explanations for
conservatism in financial reporting are the asymmetric loss functions of different parties
with stakes in the firm and the parties’ asymmetric information sets about the firm.

2.2 Empirical Approaches
The traditional textbook definition of conservatism focuses on choices among
different accounting methods (LIFO vs. FIFO, for instance). More recently, the literature
introduced a distinction between two different types of conservatism. The first is the
unconditional (or news independent) conservatism that occurs with the expensing of the
costs of most intangibles, for instance R&D costs, and is reflected in the understatement
of the book-to-market ratio.

The second is the conditional (or news dependent)

conservatism, defined as the asymmetric timeliness of recognition in accounting earnings
of news about unrealized gains and losses, which occurs with impairment of many types
of assets 6 . This differential timeliness definition is also known in literature as “earnings
conservatism” as compared with “balance sheet conservatism” of the “unconditional
conservatism” (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Pae et al. 2005). Empirical results provide

6

“The accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains
than to recognize bad news as losses” as Basu (1997) defines it.
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consistent and convincing evidence that conditional conservatism has influenced
accounting practice for more than 500 years 7 (Basu 1997; 2005) and has increased in the
recent period, both in the United States (Ryan and Zarowin 2003; Watts 2003a; Basu
1997; Pope and Walker 1999) and in other countries (Ball et al. 2000; Pope and Walker
1999; Ball et al. 2003; Bushman and Piotroski 2006)
In their recent paper, Beaver and Ryan (2005) extend their previous accounting
models (Beaver and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Zarowin 2003) to include probabilistic writedowns; they also integrate into the analysis the two distinct forms of accounting
conservatism: unconditional and conditional. Examples of unconditional conservatism
(or ex-ante, or news independent) are the immediate expensing of R&D and internally
generated intangibles, the depreciation of property, plant, and equipment faster than
economic depreciation, and the historic cost accounting for net present value projects.
Unconditional conservatism is proxied by the market-to-book ratio.

Conditional

conservatism (or ex-post, or news dependent) requires the write-down of book values of
assets under adverse conditions, but not the write-up under favorable conditions.
Examples of conditional conservatism are the adoption of the lower-of-cost-or-market
accounting rule for inventory and impairment write-downs for long-lived tangible and
intangible assets. The authors complain that recent papers on conservatism are only
concerned with estimating the extent of conditional conservatism and its association with
current and lagged returns, while not controlling for unconditional conservatism and its
frictions with conditional conservatism. Beaver and Ryan’s model (2005) captures the
interactions between conditional and unconditional conservatism, modeling different
7

The French Commercial Code as early as 1673 required the adoption of the lower-of-cost-or-market rule
for inventory. The same rule was adopted in Prussia from 1794. Moreover, Italian accounting records show
that asset write-downs were required as early as the 1400s.

8

independent variables to explain probability and size of asset impairments. The model
supports empirical results showing how market-to-book ratio (as proxy for unconditional
conservatism) is associated with lower conditional conservatism measured by the
asymmetry of the response of earnings to returns.
The issue of the interaction between conditional and unconditional conservatism, and
their measures, has been analyzed by other researchers also (Roychowdhury and Watts
2006). Basu (2005) suggests that conditional conservatism historically arose from the
periodic performance assessments needed by businessmen rather than from tax reasons.
In contrast, historical evidence shows that many forms of unconditional conservatism
arose from tax and regulatory motivations. Corporate income taxes have been influential
in the development of conservative depreciation methods with the goal to maximize the
depreciation deduction, thus minimizing corporate taxes.

Moreover, the widespread

adoption of LIFO after the Great Depression was likely due to the attempt of firms to
reduce the impact of inflation on their income taxes. In the same way, the common
expensing of all R&D expenses (before this was mandatory) under SFAS 2 appears to
have been caused by an IRS ruling. Before 1954, the IRS had an administrative policy of
allowing the deduction of R&D costs if the company consistently followed this practice
in its financial accounting.

Since 1954, the Internal Revenue Code (sec. 174) has

contained a specific provision which allows those intangibles to be deducted regardless of
the financial accounting practices. Hence, Basu argues that unconditionally conservative
accounting methods became widespread for income taxation and market regulation
reasons, and that those practices are fairly recent, since income taxes were first
introduced at the end of the eighteenth century.

9

Conditional conservatism may serve as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce
the information asymmetry among the various parties (managers, shareholders, investors,
stakeholders in general) involved in firms’ contracts, litigation, taxation, and regulation
processes.

Much of the information asymmetry arises from the firm’s investment

opportunity sets, but it also occurs because of the way the firm’s management, more
informed about events and investment opportunities, formally collects and reports
information to stakeholders.

Their information advantage gives the managers the

opportunity, through financial reporting, to transfer a firm’s wealth to themselves in the
form of insider trading and/or excess compensation based on stock prices. It is not
always possible to completely verify the incremental information of the more informed
part, which generates deadweight losses (Jensen and Meckling 1976) because managers’
time and efforts are partially directed toward transferring the firm’s wealth to themselves,
instead of maximizing the firm’s value on shareholders’ behalf. The market anticipates
these deadweight losses and reacts by discounting the firm’s stock prices (LaFond and
Watts 2006). Conditional conservatism is adopted then, LaFond and Watts (2006) argue,
as a corporate governance mechanism used in debt and/or compensation contracts,
litigation, determination of taxes, and regulation settings to reduce the information
asymmetry between the parties and the consequent deadweight losses that reduce the
firm’s expected cash flow and stock prices (Watts 2003a, 2003b). Moreover, conditional
conservatism is useful to offset managers’ incentives to overstate earnings and assets,
while understating liabilities (Pae et al. 2005).
To assess conservatism, researchers use measures which can be classified in three
broad categories (Watts 2003b): A) net asset measures, B) earnings and accruals

10

measures, and C) earnings/stock returns relation measures. For category A, FelthamOhlson valuation models (Feltham and Ohlson 1995) and book-to-market ratios are used
to estimate the extent of net assets’ undervaluation. Measures falling in this category are
able to assess unconditional conservatism, but cannot detect and measure conditional
conservatism.

Measures falling under B incorporate the notion that asymmetrical

treatment of gains and losses produces asymmetry in accruals.

Hence, negative

cumulative accruals, accruals distribution skewness, earnings distribution skewness,
earnings reversal, and accruals are used as measures of conservatism. Finally, measures
under C exploit the fact that market prices tend to reflect changes in the asset value when
those changes occur (in a timely recording of expected losses and gains), while
accounting rules delay the recognition of those changes in the case of expected gains but
not in the case of expected losses. Hence, bad news is predicted to be more highly
associated with stock returns and/or change in the market price of assets than good news.
Basu (1997; 1995) adopts this last approach and tests conditional conservatism by
regressing annual accounting earnings on stock returns for the same year separately for
companies with negative returns and positive returns, adopting returns as a proxy for
bad/good news. He predicts, and actually finds, a higher coefficient and a higher R
square for the bad news sample than for the good news sample. Specifically, he uses a
reverse regression of price-deflated earnings on an indicator variable for negative stock
returns (D), stock returns (R), and stock returns interacted with the indicator variable (all
at time t): EARN = a0 + a1D + ß0R + ß1R*D. He then tests for and finds the coefficient
ß1, which measures the difference in the slope coefficient for the negative news sample
respective to the positive news sample, to be significantly positive. Furthermore, Basu’s

11

study provides evidence that the degree of conservatism in accounting earnings increased
over the period 1963-1990. He attributes this increase to changes in the auditors’ liability
exposure; higher liability exposure is associated with higher conditional accounting
conservatism.
Following Basu (1997), a great body of literature analyzing accounting conservatism
adopted his framework in identifying and measuring conditional conservatism in its most
important consequence, namely asymmetric timeliness of expected gains and losses in
reported earnings, using the coefficient ß1 or the ratio (ß1+ ß0)/ ß0 as a measure of
conditional conservatism.

Among the early researchers, Ryan and Zarowin (2003)

investigate the reasons for a decline in the linear relation between annual stock returns
and accounting earnings over the past 30 years. They test two related explanations: 1)
earnings reflect news with a lag with respect to stock prices, and 2) earnings increasingly
reflect good and bad news in an asymmetric way. They regress annual earnings on
current and lagged (up to three periods) annual price changes, with a dummy variable for
negative price change and all the variables deflated by beginning-of-the-current-year
prices. Their analysis of this equation for annual cross-sections from 1966 to 2000 finds
strongly increasing lags and asymmetry. Earnings are more strongly associated with
lagged price changes and more weakly associated with current price changes over time.
The R square of the regression with lagged price changes grows over time, while the R
square of the regression without lagged price changes decreases over time. Moreover,
they find that earnings reflect current negative price changes more strongly over time
while reflecting current positive price changes less strongly over time. The same results

12

of earnings showing asymmetric timeliness with respect to lagged annual returns is
provided by Pope and Walker (1999).
More recently, Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) propose a theory and provide
supporting empirical results to explain the relation between asymmetric timeliness
(conditional conservatism) and market-to-book ratio (unconditional conservatism). They
decompose firms’ equity value into four additive segments: net assets at historical cost,
verifiable and recognized increases on the value of separable net assets, unverifiable
increases in the value of separable net assets, and economic rents. If, as practice seems to
suggest, the benchmark for accounting reporting is the measure of market value of net
assets, then both asymmetric timeliness and market-to-book ratio measure conservatism
with noise, because rents and unverifiable net assets cannot be commonly observed.
When returns are driven by changes in rents and unverifiable net assets changes, then the
measure of conservatism introduced by Basu (1997) is not very accurate. Roychowdhury
and Watts suggest that asymmetric timeliness is a better measure of conservatism when it
is estimated cumulatively over multiple years preceding a specific time.
LaFond and Watts (2006) add a new motivation for the demand of conditional
accounting conservatism. They provide evidence that conservatism is an equilibrium
corporate governance mechanism voluntarily adopted by firms to reduce the deadweight
losses associated with information asymmetry between equity investors 8 . They find that
information asymmetry among equity investors is strongly positively correlated with
conservatism, after controlling for other variables that previous literature identified as

8

LaFond and Watts adopt the PIN score developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) to proxy for
equity investors asymmetric information. The PIN score is the probability of an information-based trade
derived from a structural market microstructure model and it has been adopted by numerous papers to
capture the difference in the information asymmetries between informed and uninformed investors.
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relevant factors in demand for conservatism. Moreover, their tests offer evidence that
changes in information asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors
temporally lead to changes in conservatism.
Ryan (2006) argues that, despite the limitations documented in the literature and
highlighted at the end of this section, asymmetric timeliness is the most direct
consequence of conditional conservatism. Hence, asymmetric timeliness should retain its
primacy in the literature investigating conditional conservatism. The author offers four
specific suggestions for estimating asymmetric timeliness and for interpreting it as a
measure of conditional conservatism: (1) incorporate industry context and industryspecific measures of news other than returns, (2) incorporate the business cycle and how
it affects managerial incentives, (3) control or do not control for other factors affecting
asymmetric timeliness, then compare results, and (4) filter returns when they are used as
a proxy to assess asymmetric timeliness, in order to mitigate, for instance, the biases
emphasized by Dietrich et al. (2006) arising from sampling of an endogenous variable.
Among papers testing how conditional conservatism, as measured by asymmetric
timeliness, varies over time, Lobo et al. (Lobo and Zhou 2006) document an increase in
conservatism in financial reporting after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
in 2002. 9 Others (Ball et al. 2000; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Ryan and Zarowin 2003) offer
consistent evidence that the asymmetric timeliness series varies across time, explaining
the variation with changes in legal liability. Other papers in this stream of literature
present evidence of a positive association between accounting conservatism and:
- U.S. high-tech firms (Chandra et al. 2004), because they are subject to more stringent
accounting standards (SFAS 2) and higher shareholders’ litigation risk;
9

SOX, among other requirements, provides that CEOs and CFOs certify the firm’s financial statements.
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- public and larger firms in the U.K. (Ball and Shivakumar 2005);
- firms audited by one of the Big “X” (Krishnan 2005), with longer auditor tenure
(Jenkins and Velury 2006), after an audit partner rotation (Hamilton et al. 2005) and with
the accounting expertise (but not with non-accounting expertise) of the audit committee
members (Krishnan and Gnanakumar 2006).
Starting with the critique that Basu’s approach lacks an equilibrium pricing model,
Callen, Hope et al. (2005) approach the study of conservatism in accounting by adopting
the Callen and Segal asset pricing model (2004). This model expresses unexpected
changes in stock returns as a function of unexpected changes in accruals (accruals news),
unexpected shocks to current and expected future cash flow (cash flow news), and expected

return (discount rate). They find empirical evidence of a significant increasing concave
relation between unexpected changes in stock returns and earnings news. 10 Specifically,
changes in equity returns are more highly correlated with negative earnings news than
positive earnings news, reflecting that negative earnings news is recorded more promptly
in the accounting system than positive earnings news. Moreover, the results of the paper
also imply that revisions in equity returns are a quasi-concave function of special items;
i.e. revisions in equity returns are more highly positively correlated with negative special
items than with positive special items.
Dietrich et al. (2006) criticize the use of the asymmetric timeliness measure to test the
hypothesis that reported accounting earnings are “conservative.” The authors identify
econometric properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure that cause
biases in the test statistics, unless restrictive conditions are met. In particular, they
highlight two econometric biases that characterize this approach: a sample-variance-ratio
10

The model assumes earning news equal to the sum of cash flow news and accruals news.
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(SVR) bias and a sample truncation (ST) bias. These biases arise from the sampling
formation procedure on an endogenous variable 11 - returns - and the consequent
distributional properties of the truncated sample. The authors build data series that are,
by construction, devoid of asymmetric timeliness in reported earnings and show that the
asymmetric timeliness research design still finds evidence of conservative behavior, i.e. a
more timely recognition of bad news than good news in annual earnings. Moreover, they
show that cash flow from operations, in theory, is unaffected by accruals and, therefore,
by conservative accounting standards, but exhibits a stronger conservative behavior
(quicker recognition of expected losses than gains) than the operating accruals
themselves. Hence, they conclude that, because the biases originate in the asymmetric
timeliness specification design itself, alternative measures such as negative non-operating
accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000), market-to-book ratio (Feltham and Ohlson 1995), and
change in cash investments (Easton and Pae 2004) should be adopted to further
investigate accounting conservatism. The underlying assumption of the paper is that
earnings information leads (causes) returns. As a consequence, regressing earnings on
returns produces biased results that cannot be corrected. In this regard, Ryan (2006)
notices that Dietrich’s assumption seems to go against the common evidence in finance
and accounting literature that it is more likely that both earnings and returns are driven by
other, more primitive information. Indeed, when researchers regress returns on earnings,
the observed R square is extremely low, suggesting that there are other variables
important in explaining returns to investors besides reported earnings.

11

Returns, indeed, can be affected by earning information, generating endogeneity in the Basu regression.
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2.3 Theoretical Approaches
Recent authors who approach the study of conservatism in accounting from a
theoretical point of view are Bagnoli (2005) and Dierker (2006).
Bagnoli and Watts (2005) develop a signaling model to study managers’ decisions to
be more or less conservative in their financial accounting, within the limit of the rules
provided by GAAP. Under specific conditions, market investors can use the signals
coming from managers’ decisions to infer the firm’s private information and thus better
predict the firm’s future value. In their model, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) assume that
managers have private information about the probability that the firm’s future results are
good. Following their model, the authors show (Proposition 6) that the earning response
coefficient (ERC 12 ) for firms choosing not to report conservatively (in a manner that is
expected to lead to higher reported earnings) is greater than the ERC for conservative
firms, if the conservative report policy is more informative than the non-conservative
policy, and/or if a firm’s future forecast is relatively positive.
Dierker (2006) provides a model focused on regulatory conservatism, in which
accounting conservatism is a means to avoid speculative financial bubbles and stocks’
overvaluation. In his model, conservatism matters because risk-adverse agents receive
financial information from the market. However, even if they know the information has a
conservative bias, they do not know its magnitude (random bias) and cannot evaluate the
news accurately. This situation, along with concerns about overvaluation (as suggested
by Watts (Watts 2003b; 2003a)) and the fact that financial markets process negative news
with a systematic bias (in the sense that “bad news travels slowly” as Hong et al. (2000)

12

ERS is the slope coefficient in a linear regression of abnormal cumulated returns over the announcement
period.
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have shown), motivate the regulators to mandate counter-biased accounting standards.
The author provides a model in which he proves that, while the market is not perfectly
efficient and frictionless, a conservative accounting regime leads to lower equilibrium
asset prices than a full disclosure regime, justifying the conservatism in accounting as a
tool available to regulators to achieve more efficient prices.

2.4 Problem with Using Market Returns as Proxy for Good/Bad News and My Adoption
of Number of Analysts’ EPS Estimate Revisions as a Replacement Proxy
Basu (1997) defines conditional conservatism as the accountant’s tendency to require
a higher degree of verification for the recognition of good news in earnings than bad
news. To measure conditional conservatism I will adopt Basu’s definition within the
framework based on the theory of conservatism in accounting illustrated by Watts
(2003b; 2003a) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2006). In this framework, the objective
of accounting is to assess, at a point in time, the firm’s value available for interim
distribution to the company’s claimants (shareholders, bondholders, employees, other
stakeholders), and not to measure the market value of the shareholders’ equity. The
accounting system, as we can observe in practice, pursues this objective through the
adoption of rules that recognize increases in separable asset values only when they are
completely verifiable. This definition of the object of measure is key to understanding
why the variable traditionally used as a proxy of good/bad news about the firm’s future
earnings (returns to investors) introduces noise in the assessment of conditional
conservatism.
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Basu (1997) introduces market returns as a proxy for good and bad news about
expected gains/losses. Specifically, he adopts negative unexpected annual stock returns
as a proxy for bad news, and positive unexpected annual stock returns as a proxy for
good news. He tests his hypotheses in a Beaver “reverse” regression with earnings per
share deflated by beginning of period stock price as a dependent variable.

The

justification for this reverse regression design is that OLS standard errors and test
statistics are better specified when the leading variable is the independent variable and
the lagging variable is specified as dependent.
Using returns as a proxy for good and bad news about firms’ future earnings, however,
creates two main economic and econometric problems. First, if returns on the market are
driven by the value or the changes in the values (good and bad news) of rents 13 or
unobservable increases in the value of separable net assets, these changes will never be
included in reported earnings. Indeed, accounting recognizes increases in separable asset
values when they are completely verifiable but does not recognize changes in rents, nor
increases in unobservable separable net assets (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006). If this is
true, then the asymmetric timeliness approach that Basu adopts will measure conditional
conservatism rather inaccurately, because of the noise introduced by the choice of the
variable market returns as a measure of good/bad news about firms’ future earnings.
Basu’s reverse regression approach, indeed, works only if returns summarize news from
sources other than accounting earnings and the news can be, at least in principle,
recognized in earnings in the same period (Ryan 2006).

Rents, however, are only

recognized in the accounting system when they are acquired, not when they are generated

13

Where rents are defined, following the guidance of Roychowdhury and Watts (2006), as growth options
and monopoly returns.
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inside the firm. Additionally, changes in rents are recognized only for decreases in
acquired rents, and not always consistently (cfr. FAS 142). Returns, finally, may not
reflect all non-accounting information available, may reflect good and bad news
depending on the firm’s disclosure policies, or may be driven by the information content
of earnings, creating an endogeneity problem in the Basu reverse regression. Ryan’s
conclusion is: “it would be preferable to estimate asymmetric timeliness using measures
of news other than returns” (2006 p. 11).
The second problem with Basu’s framework has been highlighted in Dietrich et al.
(2006).

The authors provide a model that describes the relations among economic

income, reported accounting earnings, non-earnings information flowing to the market,
and stock returns. In their model, information (both accounting and non-accounting
information) about the firm’s underlying value (economic income) drives the firm’s stock
price. They argue that Basu’s model, reversing the relation of accounting (reported
earnings) and non-accounting information driving the firm’s stock price, and adopting
instead accounting information as the dependent variable in the regression of reported
earnings on changes in the firm’s stock price (returns), causes two types of biases:
sample-variance-ratio bias and sample truncation bias.

The regression coefficient

estimates suffer from these two biases, one arising from the regression specification and
one arising from sampling on an endogenous and asymmetrically distributed variable
(returns). Although those biases can be negligible, as Ryan (2006) points out, at least one
of the two is related to the adoption of returns, an endogenous variable, as a measure of
news and treated in the model as an independent variable.
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Ball and Shivakumar (2006), in an attempt to address the problem of using market
returns as a proxy for good/bad news, instead adopt cash flow from operations as a proxy
for good/bad news about future firm’s earnings. However, cash flow from operations
shows asymmetric timeliness, is affected by different accounting choices, is part of
earnings (causing an endogeneity problem more serious than the returns proxy), and is
highly correlated with accruals.
To address these issues with the choice of the variable to measure good/bad news, I
adopt a new measure of news: the number of financial analysts’ estimates of earnings per
share (EPS) raised/lowered over the period. Every time an accounting or non-accounting
piece of information reaches the market, financial analysts evaluate the impact of the
good/bad news on future EPS and revise (or not) their EPS estimates. Changes in the
estimates, thus, capture news arrival during the fiscal year. This measure of news offers a
few advantages over the traditional returns proxy:
-

There is no reason to believe, a priori, that the distribution of the number of analysts’
estimate revisions is non symmetric, which would address, partially, the issues raised
by Dietrich et al. (2006). Indeed, ex post, the symmetry plot of the change in
analysts’ estimates suggests that the variable exhibits a symmetric distribution around
a mean value of –1, confirmed by the skewness value of the distribution equal to –
0.049.

-

Adopting the number of analysts’ estimate revisions in EPS does attenuate the
endogeneity problem of using returns as a proxy. Changes in EPS estimates for year
t+1 from one day after the end of the fiscal year t until the end of fiscal year t+1
should not, indeed, influence the annual reported earnings of year t. This will address
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Ryan’s suggestion (Ryan 2006) of using measures of news that do not involve
returns, or filtering returns removing the portion in windows around earnings
announcements to limit the endogeneity problem.
-

The number of changes in EPS estimates should be less noisy than the returns on the
market in measuring the good/bad news. This measure will reflect all, and only, the
pieces of information (news) that will impact the firm’s future earnings and that will
have a chance to be recorded in annual earnings over the years, based on the analysts’
professional judgment.

The new approach, using the new variable associated with the adoption of a LAD
regression, allows for a more precise measure of conditional conservatism, filtering out
the noise in the previous variable to better capture the underlying asymmetry in the
recognition of good/bad news in annual reported earnings.
In summary, previous literature identified conservatism as one of the salient attributes
of financial reporting and disclosure, along with reliability and relevance. The problem,
however, is how to measure conditional conservatism in financial reporting.

The

existing literature identifies the asymmetric timeliness in reporting good or bad news in
annual reported earnings as the most important consequence of conditional conservatism.
So far, researchers have adopted the positive or negative annual returns on the market
(either between 9 months before and 3 months after fiscal year-end or over the fiscal
year) as a proxy for good/bad news, regressing annual net income over this proxy to
determine whether, and how much faster, bad news about future earnings was
incorporated in annual reported earnings compared to good news. Results show that bad
news was incorporated six times faster than good news in contemporaneous annual
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reported earnings.

Returns, however, are a very noisy proxy for good/bad news,

suffering from endogeneity and causing econometric biases in the coefficient estimates of
Basu’s research design, leading to detection of spurious conditional conservatism even
when, by sample construction, none is present (Dietrich et al. 2006). Instead of returns
on the market, I adopt a new proxy that captures and measures the flow of good/bad news
about firms’ future earnings in a in a less noisy way: the number of financial analysts’
estimates of earnings per share (EPS) raised/lowered over the period. Some of the pieces
of information about future earnings will be incorporated at the end of the fiscal period in
net income, and some will be incorporated in the future. Consequently, the regression of
net income (before extraordinary items) on the proxy for good/bad news will cast light on
the presence of conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric timeliness in recording
news about unrealized gains/losses on annual reported earnings, for the companies
included in the sample from 1991 to 2005.
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3. Model and Hypotheses
I propose to analyze accounting conservatism with a model of earnings deflated by
beginning-of-period market value on the difference in the number of upward and
downward revisions in analysts’ EPS estimates over the fiscal year (Model 1):

X it / Pit −1 = α 0 + α 1 Dit + β 0 Diff it + β1 Diff it * Dit + β 2 NumEstit

(1)

where:

X it denotes the earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data18) for firm i in
fiscal year t; Pit −1 is the market value of equity (number of shares outstanding times price
on the market from CRSP) at the beginning of the fiscal year t; Diffit is the difference
between upward and downward revisions in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i and
period t (from First Call database); Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, and
equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit is the number of analysts that are following the
company throughout the year, which I adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher
number in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of
analysts following it, but from the amount of good/bad news about the company’s future
cash flow. The model builds from Basu’s intuition of testing the different timeliness of
good/bad news reported in annual earnings. However, I made four changes to the
original Basu model: the adoption of a different variable to proxy for good/bad news
about firms’ future cash flow, the adoption of a LAD regression approach instead of the
classic OLS, the extension of the analysis to two-year and three-year time horizons, and
the presence of the control variable NumEstit.
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3.1 Analysts’ Forecast Revisions as a Proxy for Good/Bad News
The first hypothesis that I test in this dissertation is whether, using a different proxy
for good/bad news within the Basu intuitive framework, I still find asymmetric timeliness
in the recognition of good/bad news in reported earnings. If by adopting the new proxy
the asymmetry disappears, then Dietrich et al. (2006) were correct in attributing the
results found with the Basu model to the econometric biases highlighted above.
However, if by using the new proxy (which reduces the magnitude of the two biases
related to the adoption of returns as a proxy for good/bad news), the asymmetric
timeliness persists, then the asymmetric timeliness research design cannot be considered
invalid and unable to capture the conditional conservatism in the accounting system.
To test for asymmetric timeliness, I use the piecewise regression approach of Model
(1), with a dummy equal to one when the number of EPS revisions downward over the
period is higher than the number of revisions upward, which means that over the fiscal
year, analysts received more bad news about future earnings than good news. However,
since the independent variable is now related to the analysts’ forecast revisions, a quantile
regression is more appropriate than the traditional OLS regression. Indeed, previous
literature found that analysts seem to process public information regarding their earnings
forecasts in a somewhat biased way, due to “analysts’ optimism” (Ramnath et al. 2006).
Because of this optimism, I expect analysts to overvalue the good news and include it
fairly quickly in their forecast revisions.

This analysts’ optimism can explain the

different timeliness in recording good and bad news about future earnings in reported
earnings found by previous literature. Hence, upon running a traditional OLS regression,
I expect the interaction variable coefficient ( β1 ) in the model to be statistically equal to
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zero. This analysts’ inefficiency disappears if, instead of an OLS regression, researchers
use a quantile (or least absolute deviation, LAD) regression (Basu and Markov 2004).
Quantile regression assumes that analysts deal with a linear loss function, trying to
minimize their absolute forecast error instead of the square of the forecast error, as in the
OLS case. The LAD estimator, β LAD (n-element column vector), minimizes the sum of
the absolute errors. While the OLS regression provides unbiased estimators of the mean
of the dependent variable conditional on the independent variables, the LAD regression
(or, more generally, quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett 1978)) provides unbiased
estimates of the median (n quantile) of the dependent variable conditional on the
independent variables. When the dependent variable and the model errors are distributed
symmetrically and the errors are independent from the explanatory variables adopted,
both OLS and LAD yield estimates of the same parameter vector.

In this case,

researchers usually choose the estimator with the lower variance. The variance of the
estimator depends on the kurtosis of the error distribution.

OLS provides a lower

variance estimator in the case of normal distribution, while the LAD estimator is
characterized by lower variance with fat tails distributions (Basu and Markov 2004;
Newey and Powell 1987). Prior literature (Basu 1995; Frecka and Hopwood 1983)
provides evidence that scaled earnings distribution is left-skewed, which might suggest
that the conditional distribution of the dependent variable in model (1), scaled earnings, is
skewed too. Thus, I expect to find the interaction coefficient β1 positive when I run a
quantile regression. Hence, the first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: The value of the interaction variable coefficient in Model (1) is
significant and positive when I run a quantile regression, while close to zero (or even
negative) when I run an OLS regression.

3.2 Conditional Conservatism Determinants
Previous literature (Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2006) offers five alternative
explanations for conservatism in financial reporting: (1) debt and managerial contracting,
(2) taxation, (3) asymmetric information among investors, (4) asymmetric loss function
of standard setters, and (5) shareholders’ litigation.
The explanation for conditional conservatism due to debt contracting implies that
debt-holders require the firm to adopt high conservative accounting standards to avoid the
distribution of a firm’s wealth to other claimholders in case of the firm’s financial
default. If this is the correct theory to explain conservatism in accounting, then, all else
equal, I would expect a higher conservatism for firms with high leverage (higher
proportion of debt over equity) than for firms with low leverage. This leads to the second
hypothesis tested in this dissertation:

Hypothesis 2: Firms with high leverage exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than
firms with low leverage.

The managerial contracting theory explains the adoption of conditional conservative
accounting standards and practice as an attempt by the shareholders to avoid
overcompensating the firm’s managers based on future expected gains before these gains
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actually translate into positive cash flow for the firm.

The more the executives’

compensation packages are based on the firm’s accounting performances, the more I
would expect shareholders to ask for the adoption of more conservative accounting
practices. On the other hand, the more executives’ compensation packages are based on
the firm’s accounting performances (in the form of bonuses), the more I would expect the
executives to use aggressive accounting, recognizing expected gains more quickly than
losses in earnings, to increase their compensation. Then, the third hypothesis I test in the
dissertation is:

Hypothesis 3: Firms with compensation contracts for executives highly dependent on
the firm’s accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms
with compensation contracts not based on the firm’s accounting performance .

Previous literature (Basu 1997) also found that changes in the level of conservatism
over time were likely due to a change in the auditors’ legal liability exposure. When
auditors are more exposed to the risk of being sued in relation to their work, they tend to
require the client firms to be more conservative. After auditors state a going concern
opinion, then, I would expect the clients to adopt very rigorous conservative accounting
standards, to reduce the risk of legal liability for the auditors and for the management.
This leads to the fourth hypothesis that I test in the dissertation:
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Hypothesis 4: Firms that the previous year received a going concern opinion or a
clear opinion with explanatory language from auditors exhibit higher asymmetric
timeliness than other firms in the sample.
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4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
I gather market data from CRSP monthly files and accounting data from Compustat
North America annual industrial for the period between 1963 and 2005. Data about
analysts’ EPS forecasts from 1989 to 2005 come from the First Call database. Data about
auditors’ going-concern opinions from 2000 to 2005 come from the Audit Analytics
database.

Finally, executive compensation data from 1991 to 2005 are taken from

ExecuComp database.
I calculate the value of earnings deflated by the beginning of the period market value,
X/Pit, and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, X/Pwinit, as earnings before
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year t, divided by the market
value of equity (MktValit, equal to the number of shares outstanding, Compustat DATA25,
times price per share, Compustat DATA199) for firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year
t. I compute Diffit as the difference between the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum
of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i over the
fiscal period t (from First Call database). Moreover, to compare the results with the Basu
model, I calculate cumulative buy-and-hold annual returns (Rit, and winsorized at the first
and 99th percentile values, Rwinit) as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP)
over the period starting 9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal end of the

⎛ P ⎞
year 14 , divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period Rit = ⎜⎜ t ⎟⎟ − 1 . I also
⎝ Pt −1 ⎠
run the analysis calculating cumulative buy-and-hold annual returns for the fiscal period
to make sure the results are not driven by the time horizon adopted.

I collect

compensation information for all the executives of the company from the ExecuComp
14

To ensure that the market reaction to a previous year’s earnings is excluded from the analysis.
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database.

In particular, I sum for each company and each year the total salary 15

(SALARYit) the total bonus 16 (BONUSit), and other annual compensation 17 (SUMOTHit)
paid to the firm’s executives. The executive ratio (Exeit) is calculated as ExecuComp
SALARYit + all other annual compensation (SUMOTHit), divided by total current
compensation (SALARY+BONUS) plus all other annual compensation (SUMOTH) for
each year and each firm. Data are at a firm level, as I sum salary, bonus, and all other
annual compensation for all the executives of the company for each year. Market-tobook ratio (MBit) is calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided by DATA60.
Leverage (Levit) is calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6. I use
the total number of analysts following a given firm in the year (data from First Call) as a
control variable in the regression. The information about auditors’ opinions for each
company and each year come from Compustat (DATA149) and from Audit Analytics
(going_concern field). As a control for heteroskedasticity, the OLS regressions report
White t-statistics (White 1980).
Descriptive statistics of the sample show that the sample mean of total assets is
$8,971 million, the average market-to-book ratio is 3.50, and the average leverage ratio is
0.23. The mean of the scaled net income before extraordinary items is positive (1.71),
even when I winsorize the variable at the first and 99th percentile values (0.037). Positive
is also the average value of the buy and hold returns, both when I do not winsorize the
variable (12.63%) and when I do winsorize at the first and 99th percentile values
15

The dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive officers during the
fiscal year.
16
The dollar value of a bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive officers during the fiscal
year.
17
This is the amount listed under “All Other Compensation” in the Summary Compensation Table. This
includes items such as: 1) Severance Payments; 2) Debt Forgiveness; 3) Imputed Interest; 4) Payouts for
cancellation of stock options; 5) Payment for unused vacation; 6) Tax reimbursements; 7) Signing bonuses;
8) 401K contributions; 9) Life insurance premiums.
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(10.68%), suggesting that the companies in the sample are profitable and deliver positive
return to investors. The variable adopted as a proxy of good/bad news about earnings,
Diff, is symmetrically distributed around the mean value that is approximately –1,
suggesting that, on average, there is more bad news than good news over the fiscal
period. For the average company, there are 15 upward and 16 downward revisions in the
analysts’ EPS estimates over 12 months. These descriptive statistics for the sample are
consistent with other recent studies (LaFond and Watts 2006).
The correlation table, reporting Pearson correlation coefficients, shows that returns
(both winsorized and non-winsorized) exhibit a significant positive correlation with the
Diff variable, and with the number of upward revisions in the analysts’ EPS forecast.
Returns, as expected, are negatively correlated with the downward revisions in the
analysts’ EPS forecast.

The proxy variable for good/bad news, Diff, is positively

correlated with the size of the company, as measured by total assets value (DATA6 of
Compustat), with the scaled earnings variable after winsorizing (X/Pwin) and with the
firm’s market value of equity, while it is negatively correlated with the leverage ratio
(Lev).
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5. Research Design and Empirical Results

I adopt the asymmetric timeliness framework first introduced by Basu (1997) to
measure conditional conservatism, adapting it to test the four hypotheses of the
dissertation. However, I make four important changes to the original model. First, I use
the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward and the downward revisions in
the analysts’ EPS forecast to measure good/bad news. Second, I run a LAD regression
instead of an OLS regression.

Third, following the findings in previous literature

(Roychowdhury and Watts 2006), I extend the analysis to two-year and three-year time
horizons. Fourth, I control in the regression for NumEstit-j,t, the number of analysts that
are following the company throughout the year, as an indirect control of the firm’s size,
or visibility.

5.1 Hypothesis 1
I estimate the Model (1):
X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α 1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j ,t + β1 Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 2 NumEst it − j ,t

(1)

where the dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earnings deflated
by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t. Diffit-j,t is the cumulative
difference between the sum of the upward and downward revisions in the analysts’ EPS
forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). Dit-j,t is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0, and equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit-j,t, is the
number of analysts that follow the company (i between fiscal year t-j and t), which I
adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher number in the variable Diffit-j,t is not
coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts following it, but from the
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amount of good/bad news about unrealized gains/losses. Furthermore, I winsorize the
variable Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1 and returns to investors at the first and 99th percentile values to
reduce the influence of outliers, but (non-tabulated) regression results for non-winsorized
variables show qualitatively similar evidence.
[Insert table 2 about here]
I compare the results obtained estimating Model (1) using OLS and LAD regressions
with the original Basu model/variables regression results, for the three time horizons
corresponding to j=0, j=1, and j=2. As expected, Table 2 shows that, when I estimate
Model (1) with a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression, the analysts’ optimism
(Ramnath et al. 2006) overcomes the conservative accounting standards and the model
fails to detect any asymmetry in the timeliness of recognition of good/bad news about
future earnings over the sample (interaction coefficient positive but not statistically
different from zero) when the analysis is limited to a one year period (j=0). Expanding
the time horizon with an OLS regression to two and three years (j=1 and j=2) shows
evidence of conditional conservatism (interaction coefficient β1 positive and statistically
significant). These results provide indirect support for expanding the time horizon to
two/three years when adopting an OLS regression, because, as previous literature
suggested, Basu’s single-period asymmetry is just an implication of accounting standards
requiring asymmetric verification for the recognition of good and bad news in accounting
earnings, and not a measure of the aggregate conditional conservatism at the firm level
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2006).
When I adopt a LAD regression, to take into consideration the linear loss function
that previous research identified as more appropriate for financial analysts (Basu and
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Markov 2004; Clatwhrthy et al. 2006), I consistently find, as expected, a positive and
significant value for the coefficient of the interaction term over all the time horizons
(equal to 0.000289, t value of 7.31 for j=0, 0.000268, t value of 5.14 for j=1, and equal to
0.000260, t value of 3.93 for j=2). Results for the LAD regression show a consistent
presence of conditional conservatism over the three time horizons. If I adopt the relative
measure of asymmetry that has been used in the accounting literature since Basu (1997),
calculating the ratio of (β1+β0)/β0 to measure how much fasterbad news is recognized in
reported annual earning than good news, I find that bad news is recognized in reported
earnings respectively 7.1 times (for j=0), 4.5 times (for j=1) and 3.0 times (for j=2) faster
than good news. There is an evident decreasing trend in the asymmetric timeliness 18
when the analysis is extended from one to three-year horizon, suggesting, again, that the
extension of the time horizon recommended by Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) is
appropriate. If I run the traditional Basu model over the sample (with returns as a proxy
for good/bad news), I find results consistent with the presence of conservatism as in the
original Basu model, thereby indirectly validating the sample adopted in this study.

5.2 Hypothesis 2
To test the hypothesis of increase in conditional conservatism associated with
increase in the importance of debt as a source of financing for the company operations, I
subdivide the sample in quartiles based on the leverage ratio (Levit) for firm i at time t,
18

Although I do not formally run cross-equation tests for the statistical difference of the ratio values among
the different time horizons, I do run simple F tests for a range of constant values to see which values each
ratio is statistically different from. This creates a confidence interval for each ratio. The ratio of 7.1 for j=0
is statistically different from the value 3 (F value of 5.12, p value of 0.0237) but not statistically different
from the value 4.5 (F value of 1.01, p value of 0.3143). The ratio of 4.5 for j=1 is not statistically different
from either 3 or 7.1 (respectively F value of 2.10, p value of 0.1470 and F value of 0.55, p value of 0.4596).
Finally, The ratio of 3 is statistically different (at 10% confidence level) from the value of 7.1 (F value of
3.60, p value of 0.0579) but not different from the value of 4.5 (F value of 1.10, p value of 0.2933).
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calculated as firm’s total debt (DATA9+DATA34 of Compustat) divided by total assets
(DATA6 of Compustat). Then, I measure the conditional conservatism in the lowest and
highest quartile with Model (1) running a LAD regression (Table 3 Panel A and B).
[Insert table 3 about here]
Furthermore, I run the model, based on Model (1) with the new variable Lev, to
measure the leverage ratio (Model 2):

X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j ,t + β1 Levit − j ,t + β 2 Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t +

β 3 Levit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 4 Levit − j ,t * Diff it − j ,t + β 5 Levit − j ,t * Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 2 NumEstit − j ,t

(2)

where all the variables are defined above, and Levit-j,t is the leverage ratio. Consistent
with results from previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2006), I expect to find a higher
level of conservatism (higher coefficient estimate for β1) from Model (1) for companies
with high leverage ratio (Table 3 Panel B) than for companies with low leverage ratio
(Table 3 Panel A). I also expect a significant and positive value for the estimate of the
coefficient β5, in Model (2), which shows how bad news is recorded in annual reported
earnings more quickly than good news for companies with higher leverage ratio (Table 3
Panel C).
Results for firms in the lowest quartile (Table 3 Panel A), with a low annual debt-toassets ratio (leverage ratio mean value equal to 0.0158), show for Model (1) a positive
and significant interaction coefficient estimate β1 (equal to 0.00025, T value of 1.96 for
j=2), providing evidence of conditional conservatism, i.e. bad news recognized in annual
earnings more quickly than good news. Results for firms in the highest leverage ratio
quartile (Table 3 Panel B), with leverage ratio mean value of 0.5042, show for Model (1)
an interaction coefficient estimate β1 non-statistically different from zero (-0.000017, T
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value of 0.08 for j=2), exhibiting, rather surprisingly, symmetric timeliness in the
recording of good/bad news in annual reported earnings. For firms with high debt-toassets ratio, then, there is no evidence of the use of conservative accounting, with good
news recognized in annual reported earnings as fast as bad news. Table 3 Panel C reports
the results of the estimation of Model (2). Contrary to the expectations originating from
previous literature’s suggestion that debt contracting is a determinant of conditional
conservatism, results show a positive association between the level of leverage ratio and
the speed of recognition in annual reported earnings of good news, instead of bad news.
Although these results are not consistent with the findings in the conservative accounting
stream of literature (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006; LaFond and Watts 2006), they are
consistent with results provided by the earnings management literature. Companies with
a high leverage ratio (closer to default in debt provisions than companies with low
leverage ratio) are more likely to take higher risks and “manage” earnings, through a
relatively faster recognition of expected gains, in order to reduce the chances of not
meeting the requirements included in the debt indentures. This behavior would cause a
reduction in the level of conservatism in their annual reported earnings.

5.3 Hypothesis 3
To test the third hypothesis, I gather data from the Executive Compensation section of
Compustat for firms between 1992 and 2005. First, I measure the amount of annual
compensation that does not depend on firm accounting performance: SALARY, equal to
the dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive
officers during the fiscal year and all other annual compensation (ALLOTHTOT), which
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includes items such as severance payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts
for cancellation of stock options, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements,
signing bonuses, 401K contributions, and life insurance premiums.
Second, I measure the amount of total current compensation (SALARY+BONUS)
from ExecuComp and add all other annual compensation (ALLOTHTOT) to calculate the
total annual compensation 19 .
Third, I compute Exe as the ratio of SALARY+ALLOTHTOT divided by the total
annual compensation (SALARY+BONUS+ALLOTHTOT) and use it as an index of the
incentives for executives to use an aggressive accounting practice, recognizing unrealized
gains more quickly than unrealized losses in the annual reported earnings, with the aim to
increase their total annual compensation. The lower the index, the higher the incentives
for executives to adopt aggressive accounting practice. Managers can increase their total
annual compensation, for example, by accelerating the recognition in actual earnings of
future unrealized gains, within GAAP rules. On the other side of the coin, shareholders
know about these incentives. In fact, previous literature provided evidence that they
enforce more stringent conservative accounting rules as the firm executives’ incentives
to adopt an aggressive accounting practice raise (Watts 2003a, 2003b), to reduce the
chances of overpaying the firm’s managers.
To test the hypothesis that firms with compensation contracts for executives highly
dependent on the firm’s accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness
than firms with compensation contracts not dependent on a firm’s performance, I adopt
the following model, adapting Model (1) with the introduction of a new variable Exe to
19

I do not use the variable total annual compensation (TDC2) from ExecuComp because TDC2 includes
items such as the net value of stock options exercised. The inclusion of stock options and other stock-based
compensation incentives rather than earnings based incentive would confound my results.

38

measure the incentives of the firm’s executives to adopt a more timely recognition of
unrealized gains than losses in annual earnings (Model 3):
X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α1Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j ,t + β1Exeit − j ,t + β 2 Diffit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t
+ β 3 Exeit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 4 Exeit − j ,t * Diffit − j ,t + β 5 Exeit − j ,t * Diffit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 6 NumEst

(3)

All the variables are defined above. I expect to find the coefficient of the interaction term
β5 negative and statistically significant, indicating that, as previous literature pointed out
(Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2006), one of the determinants of conditional
conservatism in accounting is its use by shareholders as an efficient form of firm
governance, particularly in management compensation contracts.

The higher the

executive ratio index value (Exe), the higher the portion of the total annual compensation
that does not depend on firm accounting performances. Hence, I would expect the
incentives for shareholders to ask for a rigorous enforcement of conditional conservatism
to decrease in response to the decrease in the executives’ incentives to recognize good
news more quickly than bad news in the annual reported earnings.
[Insert table 4 about here]
Table 4 shows that, contrary to expectations, the coefficient estimate for the
interaction term β5 for Model (3) is positive and significant at 5% level in the two-year
time horizon (j=1), and in the three-year time horizon (j=2), while it is not statistically
different from zero in the one-year time horizon (j=0). This provides evidence that firms
implementing executive compensation more dependent on a firm’s accounting
performances recognize unrealized gains in earnings in a more timely manner than losses.
The results seem to confirm the relative power of the firm’s executives over shareholders.
Indeed, executives have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to increase their
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annual compensation package, particularly when the annual package heavily depends on
bonuses based on the firm’s accounting performance, while shareholders have incentives
to enforce conservative accounting rules to reduce the chances of overpaying the firm’s
management.

5.4 Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 tests the association between the auditors’ opinion at the time t-1 and
the level of conditional conservatism at time t. Moreover, it tests the association between
auditors’ going concern opinion at time t-1, t, and t+1 and the level of conditional
conservatism at time t. The codes that Compustat (DATA149) uses for the auditor
opinion are:
0. Financial statements are unaudited
1. Unqualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect no unresolvable restrictions and
auditor has no significant exceptions as to the accounting principles, the
consistency of their application, and the adequacy of information disclosed
2. Qualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect the effects of some limitation on
the scope of the examination or some unsatisfactory presentation of financial
information, but are otherwise presented fairly. We assign this code when a
company is in the process of liquidating (even if opinion is not actually qualified)
or when an opinion states that the financial statements do not present fairly the
financial position of the company
3. Disclaimer of or No Opinion. Auditor refuses to express an opinion regarding the
company’s ability to sustain operations as a going concern
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4. Unqualified Opinion with Explanatory Language. Auditor has expressed an
unqualified opinion regarding the financial statements but has added explanatory
language to the auditor’s standard report
5. Adverse Opinion. Auditor has expressed an adverse opinion.
Among firms with auditors’ opinion code 4, we find companies that just changed their
accounting policies from the previous year and companies where auditors qualify their
opinion with a going concern assumption. Data about auditors’ opinions qualified with a
going concern assumption (GCO) come from the Audit Analytics database.
To test this hypothesis, I adapt Model (1) adding the new variable Code1 to test for
differences in conditional conservatism for companies who receive a Code 1 (clear)
auditor opinion with respect to other companies in the sample (Model 4):
X it / Pit = α 0 + α1Dit + β 0 Diff it + β1Code1it + β 2 Diff it * Dit + β 3Code1it * Dit
+ β 4Code1it * Diff it + β 5Code1it * Diff it * Dit + β 6 NumEstit

(4)

where all the variables are defined above and Code1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
companies that received Code 1 the previous year and zero otherwise.

Indeed, no

company in the sample reports an auditor opinion Code of 3 or 5. In fact, there are only 4
observations for companies receiving an audit opinion Code 2 and 7 observations for
companies with unaudited financial statements (Code 0).
[Insert Table 5 Panel A about here]
To test the association between going concern opinions and conditional conservatism,
I adopt Model (4b):
X it / Pit −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit + β 0 Diff it + β1GCOit + j + β 2 Diff it * Dit + β 3GCOit + j * Dit
+ β 4GCOit * Diff it + β 5GCOit + j * Diff it * Dit + β 6 NumEstit

(4b)
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Where all the variables are defined as above and the variable GCOit+j, with data from the
database Audit Analytics between 2000 and 2005, is equal to 1 if the firm i received a
going concern opinion from the auditors: (1) one year before (j=-1), (2) the same year
(j=0), or (3) will receive a going concern opinion the next year (j=+1), zero otherwise.
[Insert Table 5 Panel B about here]
Furthermore, I estimate model (5) to assess whether the level of conservatism varies
with the choice of one of the BigX audit firms vs. smaller audit firms, again introducing
in Model (1) a variable (BigX) to characterize the companies in the sample with an audit
opinion from one of the big 4/7 audit firms vs. the other companies. (Model 5) is:
X it / Pit −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit + β 0 Diffit + β1BigX it + β 2 Diffit * Dit + β 3 BigX it * Diff it
+ β 4 BigX it * Dit + β 5 BigX it * Dit * Diffit + β 6 NumEstit

(5)

where the variables are defined as above and BigX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
company was audited the previous year by one of the big 4/7 audit companies, 0
otherwise.
[Insert Table 5 Panel C about here]
I would expect that, after receiving a clear opinion with explanatory language (Code
4), a company will exhibit a higher conditional conservatism than other companies in the
sample, to lower the legal liability risk for the firm’s auditor and managers. However, it
should be noted that “better” companies, who received a clear opinion from auditors the
previous year (Code 1) might already start from a higher level of conditional
conservatism than companies that receive a clear opinion but with explanatory language.
In this case, indeed, the auditor acknowledges that something in the firm’s financial
reporting might raise concerns, and feels the need to explain why. I would expect,
furthermore, that companies with aggressive accounting behaviors ( recognizing annual
42

earnings of expected gains faster than losses) would change

to a more rigorous

accounting conservatism after receiving a going concern opinion from their auditors, to
reduce the risk of legal liability in case of bankruptcy or default on debt provisions for
both the auditors and the management.
Table 5 Panel A reports the results of the estimation of Model (4) for companies that
received an audit opinion code 1 the previous year. Panel B reports results of the
estimation of Model (4b) for companies that received an opinion qualified with a going
concern assumption, and Panel C reports the results for the LAD regression adopting
Model (5). Finally, Panel D reports the list of auditors from Compustat with the relative
number of observations in the sample.
There is evidence (the coefficient estimate for the interaction coefficient β5 in Model
(4) is positive and significant at the 10% confidence level) of more timely recognition of
bad news than good news in reported earnings for companies that received an unqualified
opinion (Code 1) than for companies that received an unqualified opinion with
explanatory language. Again, if I adopt the relative measure of asymmetry and calculate
the ratio of (β1+β0)/β0 to measure how much faster bad news is recognized in reported
annual earning than good news, I find that firms that received a Code 1 audit opinion
recognize bad news in financial statements 11.6 times faster than good news, while firms
that received a Code 4 opinion from their auditors recognize bad news in financial
statements only 3.6 times faster than good news 20 . The results are not surprising because
firms that received a clear audit opinion (Code 1) already exhibit a starting higher level of

20

The value of the ratio of 11.6 for Code 1 companies is, at the 10% level, significantly different for the
value of the ratio for companies receiving a Code 4 opinion from the auditors. Indeed, if I test for the
difference between the value of the ratio of 11.6 from a constant value of 3.6, I obtain an F value of 2.94,
with a p value of 0.0862.
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conditional conservatism than other firms, as shown when I use the contemporaneous
auditor opinion variable instead of the lagged value in Model (4) (untabulated results).
Table 5 Panel B reports the results for the sample of 6,282 firm-year observations,
from 2000 to 2005, with information from the Audit Analytics database about whether
the auditors’ opinion has been qualified with the going concern assumption. Results
show that companies that in the next year will receive an auditor’s opinion qualified with
the going concern assumption were less conservative, i.e. more aggressive from an
accounting point of view, than the rest of the companies in the sample, with a coefficient
β5 in column (3) negative and statistically significant, equal to –0.007 (T value of 2.06).
In other words, these companies were recognizing unrealized gains faster than unrealized
losses in annual earnings. However, the accounting behavior of these firms changes the
year they receive a going concern opinion from the auditors (and the year following it)
with bad news recognized in the annual earnings more quickly than good news (the
estimate of coefficient β5 for column 1 and 2 is positive and highly significant).
Table 5 Panel C reports results for companies that hired one of the Big 7 audit firms
vs. companies that were audited by a smaller audit firm. Results provide evidence of the
presence of conditional conservatism. Companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms
(the Big 4 plus other three firms) recognize bad news in reported earnings two times
faster than good news. Companies who were audited the previous year by one of the Big
4 audit firms (untabulated results) recognize bad news in reported earnings 6.2 times
faster than good news. When I compare the conservative behavior of companies that the
previous year were audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms vs. smaller audit firms, I find
strong evidence that companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms are characterized
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by higher levels of conditional conservatism than companies that were audited by smaller
firms. Indeed, the estimate of the interaction coefficient β5 for model (5) is positive and
statistically significant (0.000247, T value of 2.00).
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6. Sensitivity Checks

In this section I will run again a few data analyses to ensure the results in the previous
section are not dependent on the specific methodology adopted in the dissertation.

6.1 Fiscal Year Return
I run the Basu model again, calculating returns over the fiscal year instead of for the
period between nine months before and three months after the fiscal year end. Model
(1a) is:
X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α 1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Rit − j ,t + β1 Rit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 2 NumEst it − j ,t

(1a)

where all the variables are defined as in chapter 4, and Rit-1,t, is the buy-and-hold returns
of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values,
calculated as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting
the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending at the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the
stock price at the end of the period, t-j-1. Results, untabulated, are similar and consistent
with the results for the Basu model described above in Chapter 4 and tabulated in Table
2, column (3), (6), and (9).

6.2 Fama-Macbeth Regression
To check if results presented in the dissertation are dependent on the particular regression
model adopted (LAD regression), I run the analysis again adopting a Fama-Macbeth
regression model, consistent with previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2006;
Roychowdhury and Watts 2006). This approach runs an OLS regression for each year
across the firms in the sample, and averages the estimated regression coefficient over the
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time series considered. As expected, since the Fama-Macbeth regression uses an OLS
approach, results over the one-year horizon (j=0) show a non-significant coefficient
estimate for the interaction term β1 in Model (1a), consistent with the results tabulated in
Table 2 column (3).

6.3 Change in the Cut-off Point to Create the Dummy Variable
One of the problems previous literature (Dietrich et al. 2006) finds in the asymmetric
timeliness approach to measuring conditional conservatism is that the sub-samples
good/bad news about future cash flow are not created at the mean value of the proxy
variable adopted. In my findings, the mean value for the variable Diff is –0.96 across the
sample for the one-year, -1.95 for the two-year, and –2.95 for the three-year time horizon.
I run the analysis redefining the dummy variable D as Dit-j,t=1 for Diffit<–0.96 with j=0,
Dit-j,t=1 for Diffit-1,t <–1.95 with j=1, and Dit-2,t=1 for Diffit-j,t<–2.95 with j=2. 21 When I
run this analysis, I obtain results qualitatively consistent with the values presented in
Chapter 4, except for hypothesis 4. With the new cut-off point, there is no statistical
difference in the level of conditional conservatism between companies that in the
previous year have been audited by one of the big 4/7 audit firms and the other
companies in the sample (interaction coefficient β5 in Model (5) is equal to 0,00002, T
value equal to 0.2).

21

This new cut-off point does not make, in my opinion, economic sense. When a company received, over
the two-year period, one more EPS downward forecast revision than upward revision, even if this result is
better than the average of the value of Diff for all the companies in the sample, it still means that the market
received one more negative news about the firms future earnings than positive news. It would be a mistake
to consider that company in the “good news” sample if we stick to the definition of good news as having
more news about unrealized gains than losses.
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7. Conclusion and Future Research

Following Basu’s (1997) seminal work, accounting literature adopted the Basu
single-period model to measure conditional conservatism. However, the proxy chosen to
measure the arrival of good/bad news about firms’ future earnings, the price of the stock,
can vary due to factors that will never be recorded in firms’ reported earnings over the
years. This unreliability introduces economic and econometric biases into the analysis
(Dietrich et al. 2006) and causes inaccuracy in the measure of conditional conservatism.
To overcome the problem, I introduce a new measure of conditional conservatism,
applying a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression and adopting the
number of changes in financial analysts’ EPS forecasts as a proxy for good/bad news
about future earnings. Then I use this new measure to test the determinants, suggested by
previous literature, of conditional conservatism in accounting.

Results show that

companies with (1) lower debt-to-assets ratio, (2) high proportion of executives’ annual
compensation not depending on the firm’s accounting performance, (3) one of the big
4/big 7 audit firms as auditor, and a auditor opinion qualified with a going concern
assumption the previous year exhibit a higher asymmetry in the reporting of news about
firms’ expected gains/losses in annual earnings.
Results also confirm the auditor choice as one of the determinants of conditional
conservatism. However, results do not show evidence of an increase in conservatism
associated with an increase in the firm’s leverage ratio. Finally, results do not support the
view of conditional conservatism as an optimal corporate governance mechanism for
executive compensation. Indeed, I find that firms with a higher proportion of executive
compensation depending on the firm’s accounting performance implement aggressive
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accounting instead of conservative, recognizing unrealized gains more quickly than
unrealized losses in the firm’s annual earnings report.
As always, the results are only as good as the variables that I adopt to measure the
underlying phenomena. If the variable leverage ratio (Lev) and executive ratio (Exe) are
able to capture, respectively, the importance of creditors and bond-holders among firms’
stakeholders and the firm executives’ incentives to adopt more aggressive accounting
policies, then we can rule out debt and managerial contractual reasons to explain
conditional conservatism, in favor of the auditor choice and auditor influence
determinant. However, if these variables capture only partially the underlying reality,
then caution should be used in drawing conclusions from the results of the empirical
analysis. It is certain, however, that empirical evidence for the sample adopted shows
that the auditor influence on clients is a more likely reason for the adoption of higher
levels of conditional conservatism with respect to debt or compensation contracting
reasons.

7.1 Future Research
Future avenues of research include the use of the new measure of conditional
conservatism to analyze the interaction and the preemptive role of unconditional and
conditional conservatism, as highlighted in recent literature (Beaver and Ryan 2005;
Ryan 2006).
Moreover, the adoption of a different regression model that allows for asymmetric
loss function should be explored. Indeed, it is not clear what form of loss function
investors and financial analysts face. If, as it might be likely, they are more concerned
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with overestimated than underestimated earnings, then a linear or square loss function
may not be the appropriate form to use because they both reflect symmetric losses. How
to specify a plausible and non arbitrary asymmetric loss function, however, is not clear.
One possible solution is to follow the method developed first by Elliot (2003), who
illustrates a general class of asymmetric loss functions nesting the symmetric linear and
the quadratic loss functions. With such a general model, which encompasses different
forms of loss functions, researchers will not be constrained by assumptions about a
specific functional form, and would be more likely to closely model the complexity of the
real world.
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Table 1 Panel A Summary Statistics

X/P
X/Pwin
Diff
foreup
foredown
R
Rwin
SALARY
BONUS
SUMOTH
Lev
MB
MktVal
data6
data25

Obs
17656
17656
21201
21201
21201
18787
18787
21201
21201
21201
20864
19989
19990
20963
20818

Mean
1.717104
.0366615
-.9603321
15.6253
16.58563
.1263371
.106855
2180.806
1904.259
485.5704
.2331752
3.503217
5270.543
8971.586
136.1432

Std. Dev.
191.9707
.1036586
26.24441
21.50789
22.4067
.6991903
.5175039
18597.96
3980.28
4622.145
.9548152
42.40155
18168.66
43301.18
419.1405

Min
-10.79757
-.571178
-238
0
0
-1
-.7849463
0
0
-111.731
0
-876.9447
.0325
0
0

Max
25285.71
.2420474
204
245
278
27.29412
2.421277
2705195
196710.9
603851.9
135.25
5603.074
467092.9
1291803
10862

Where:
X/Pit, and X/Pwinit (winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values) is the value of earning deflated by
the beginning of the period market value, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat
DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year t, divided by the market value of equity (MktValit equal to the number of
share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199). Diffit is the difference
between the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’
EPS forecast for firm i over the fiscal period t (from First Call database). Rit, and Rwinit (winsorized at the
first and 99th percentile values) is the buy-and-hold annual returns, calculated as the increase in the price of
stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal end of
the year, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period

⎛ P ⎞
Rit = ⎜⎜ t ⎟⎟ − 1 . SALARYit is the sum
⎝ Pt −1 ⎠

of the total salary, BONUSit is the sum of the total bonus, and SUMOTHit is the sum of all other annual
compensation paid to the executives for firms i in year t. Levit is the leverage ration and it is calculated as
Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each year. MBit is the Market-to-book
ratio calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided by DATA60. Finally, data6it is the total value of
assets and data25it is the number of shares outstanding for each company i in year t, from Compustat.

59

Table 1 Panel B Correlation Table

X/P
X/Pwin
Diff
f_up
f_down
R
Rwin
SALARY
BONUS
SUMOTH
Lev
MB
MktVal
data6
data25

X/P X/Pwin
1.000
0.018
(0.015)
-0.024
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.691)
0.026
(0.001)
0.002
(0.797)
0.003
(0.694)
-0.001
(0.945)
-0.003
(0.685)
-0.002
(0.803)
-0.006
(0.391)
-0.004
(0.626)
0.006
(0.453)
0.008
(0.268)
0.010
(0.172)

Diff

f_up

f_down

R

Rwin

SALARY BONUS SUMOTH

Lev

MB

MktVal data6 data25

1.000
0.207
(0.000)
0.124
(0.000)
-0.125
(0.000)
0.129
(0.000)
0.171
(0.000)
0.004
(0.608)
0.120
(0.000)
-0.013
(0.089)
-0.131
(0.000)
-0.027
(0.000)
0.036
(0.000)
0.068
(0.000)
-0.009
(0.244)

1.000
0.575
(0.000)
-0.619
(0.000)
0.151
(0.000)
0.188
(0.000)
0.007
(0.341)
0.150
(0.000)
-0.009
(0.185)
-0.032
(0.000)
0.009
(0.187)
0.109
(0.000)
0.038
(0.000)
0.033
(0.000)

1.000
0.286
(0.000)
0.054
(0.000)
0.076
(0.000)
0.029
(0.000)
0.301
(0.000)
0.094
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.398)
0.009
(0.193)
0.339
(0.000)
0.195
(0.000)
0.333
(0.000)

1.000
-0.126
(0.000)
-0.150
(0.000)
0.020
(0.004)
0.113
(0.000)
0.101
(0.000)
0.032
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.775)
0.201
(0.000)
0.143
(0.000)
0.282
(0.000)

1.000
0.871
(0.000)
0.001
(0.859)
0.012
(0.112)
-0.014
(0.062)
-0.015
(0.046)
0.022
(0.003)
-0.021
(0.006)
-0.017
(0.020)
-0.041
(0.000)

1.000
0.003
(0.651)
0.022
(0.003)
-0.013
(0.072)
-0.019
(0.011)
0.029
(0.000)
-0.019
(0.010)
-0.016
(0.026)
-0.046
(0.000)

1.000
0.023
(0.001)
0.016
(0.019)
0.000
(0.982)
-0.000
(0.993)
0.023
(0.001)
0.017
(0.013)
0.024
(0.001)

1.000
0.146
(0.000)
0.021
(0.002)
0.001
(0.860)
0.312
(0.000)
0.484
(0.000)
0.278
(0.000)

1.000
0.010
(0.148)
-0.002
(0.748)
0.151
(0.000)
0.126
(0.000)
0.157
(0.000)

1.000
0.001 1.000
(0.940)
-0.004 0.016
(0.566) (0.024)
0.023 -0.004
(0.001) (0.601)
-0.003 0.009
(0.692) (0.202)

1.000
0.425 1.000
(0.000)
0.840 0.357
(0.000) (0.000)

1.000

The table includes Pearson correlation coefficients. Variables are defined as in panel A.
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Table 2 Hypothesis 1
LAD and OLS: X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α 1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j ,t + β1 Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 2 NumEst it − j ,t
and Basu: X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α 1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Rit − j ,t + β1 Rit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 2 NumEst it − j ,t
(1) LAD j=0 (2) OLS j=0 (3) Basu j=0 (4) LAD j=1 (5)OLS j=1 (6)Basu j=1 (7)LAD j=2 (8)OLS j=2 (9)Basu j=2
-0.015904
-0.033642
0.018729
-0.023991
-0.050599
0.036636
-0.025886
-0.056992
-0.006039
(16.95)**
(16.70)**
(7.98)**
(12.98)**
(13.02)**
(7.51)**
(8.64)**
(9.62)**
(1.14)
0.000047
0.000374
[-0.005015]
0.000075
0.000350 [-0.018171]
0.000128
0.000346 [-0.009125]
Diff/ [R]
(1.78)
(9.53)**
(2.00)*
(2.23)*
(7.09)**
(8.53)**
(3.04)**
(5.71)**
(2.20)*
0.000289
0.000060
[0.201470]
0.000268
0.000259
[0.263361]
0.000260
0.000417
[0.022782]
Diff*D/[R]*D
(7.31)**
(0.82)
(21.74)**
(5.14)**
(2.51)*
(17.42)**
(3.93)**
(3.25)**
(2.62)**
-0.000328
0.000129
0.000174
-0.000437
0.000477
0.000379
-0.000486
0.000622
0.000462
NumEst
(3.99)**
(0.84)
(1.26)
(4.64)**
(2.72)**
(2.19)*
(4.42)**
(3.17)**
(2.39)*
0.066130
0.053636
0.053705
0.127787
0.098705
0.100208
0.186367
0.141826
0.111801
Constant
(91.81)**
(37.13)**
(37.32)**
(82.41)**
(32.72)**
(32.08)**
(70.51)**
(28.70)**
(20.03)**
17656
17656
17646
13548
13548
11995
10302
10302
9062
Observations
[0.034]
0.059
0.097
[0.025]
0.053
0.066
[0.022]
0.050
0.003
[Pseudo] R
Square
For OLS regression, robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
D

Where:
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t,
winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market
value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share,
Compustat DATA199). Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downitj,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0,
equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit-j,t is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year. For the OLS models based on Basu
framework, (model 3, 6, and 9), Rit-j,t, is the buy-and-hold returns of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values,
calculated as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending 3
months after the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period, t-j-1, and Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Ritj,t<0, equal to zero otherwise. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report results for the 1 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) report results for the 2 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression. Columns (7), (8), and (9) report
results for the 3 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression.
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Table 3 Hypothesis 2
X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j ,t + β1 Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 2 NumEst it − j ,t

Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel A Low Leverage Group Mean Lev=0.0158

D
Diff
Diff*D
NumEst
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R Square

(1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2
-0.016892
-0.023323
-0.029246
(10.55)**
(6.21)**
(5.93)**
-0.000061
0.000075
0.000060
(1.39)
(1.11)
(0.84)
0.000319
0.000110
0.000250
(4.42)**
(0.94)
(1.96)*
-0.000891
-0.001099
-0.001149
(6.19)**
(5.65)**
(6.15)**
0.060561
0.114899
0.168393
(53.22)**
(38.92)**
(41.29)**
4434
3372
2494
0.035
0.023
0.029

Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel B High Leverage Group Mean Lev=0.5042

D
Diff
Diff*D
NumEst
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R square

(1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2
-0.019893
-0.032671
-0.028973
(8.90)**
(6.60)**
(3.06)**
0.000380
0.000598
0.000699
(4.81)**
(5.32)**
(4.37)**
0.000064
-0.000065
-0.000017
(0.61)
(0.43)
(0.08)
-0.000058
0.000308
0.000204
(0.27)
(1.11)
(0.53)
0.065021
0.123288
0.179368
(35.77)**
(28.06)**
(20.29)**
4171
3107
2331
0.040
0.039
0.035

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The tables present result of LAD regressions estimated over the 1992-2005 time horizon. The low and high
leverage groups represent the first (lowest) and the fourth (highest) quartile of firms ranked annually on the
leverage ratio (Levit-j,t) calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each
year. Panel A report the results of the LAD regression for companies in the lowest quartile while panel B report
the results for companies in the highest quartile. The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value
of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and
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99th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by
the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding,
Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199. Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between
the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS
forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
Diffit-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit-j,t is the number of analyst that are following the company
throughout the year.
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Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel C Method b)

X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α1Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j , t + β1Levit − j ,t + β 2 Diffit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t
+ β 3 Levit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 4 Levit − j ,t * Diffit − j ,t + β 5 Levit − j ,t * Diffit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 6 NumEstit − j ,t

D
Diff
Lev
Diff*D
Lev*D
Lev*Diff
Lev*Diff*D
NumEst
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R square

(1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2
-0.012102
-0.019229
-0.017313
(9.87)**
(7.72)**
(4.00)**
-0.000151
-0.000094
-0.000128
(4.73)**
(2.97)**
(2.29)*
0.007795
0.035253
0.072238
(2.63)**
(5.59)**
(6.27)**
0.000455
0.078746
0.000290
(8.94)**
(25.66)**
(3.03)**
-0.017043
-0.026517
-0.044621
(4.06)**
(2.93)**
(2.78)**
0.001238
0.001325
0.001658
(10.35)**
(9.26)**
(7.72)**
-0.001137
0.000110
-0.000682
(6.55)**
(0.70)
(2.02)*
-0.000381
-0.000512
-0.000550
(5.34)**
(6.75)**
(5.65)**
0.064295
0.127512
0.172233
(74.51)**
(69.10)**
(52.45)**
17541
13404
10175
0.038
0.043
0.030

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Where:
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the
period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. It is calculated as
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where
market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times
price per share, Compustat DATA199. Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward
(f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i
between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0,
equal to zero otherwise. The leverage ratio (Levit-j,t) is calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided
by DATA6 for each firm and each year. For j=1, it’s the average of the leverage ratio over the two-year
period, and for j=2 it’s the average of the leverage ratio for the company for the three-year period.
NumEstit-j,t is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.
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Table 4 Hypothesis 3

X it − j ,t / Pit − j −1,t −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit − j ,t + β 0 Diff it − j ,t + β1 Exeit − j ,t + β 2 Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t
+ β 3 Exeit − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 4 Exeit − j ,t * Diff it − j ,t + β 5 Exeit − j ,t * Diff it − j ,t * Dit − j ,t + β 6 NumEstit − j ,t
(1) LAD j=0 (2) LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2
0.002629
0.003980
0.001075
(0.80)
(0.55)
(0.09)
0.000036
0.000218
0.000406
Diff
(0.52)
(2.16)*
(3.05)**
-0.054391
-0.114888
-0.073033
Exe
(16.80)**
(15.53)**
(13.64)**
0.000325
-0.000037
-0.000225
Diff*D
(2.88)**
(0.22)
(0.97)
-0.020689
-0.035600
-0.016487
Exe*D
(4.46)**
(3.44)**
(2.16)*
-0.000090
-0.000339
-0.000265
Exe*Diff
(0.74)
(1.94)
(2.72)**
-0.000026
0.000504
0.000353
Exe*D*Diff
(0.16)
(2.00)*
(2.37)*
-0.000717
-0.000896
-0.001015
NumEst
(9.32)**
(10.33)**
(10.09)**
0.101810
0.206789
0.307979
Constant
(47.32)**
(41.96)**
(36.91)**
17656
13603
10419
Observations
0.0574
0.0542
0.0623
Pseudo R square
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
D

Where:
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the
period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. It is calculated as
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where
market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times
price per share, Compustat DATA199. Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward
(f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i
between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0,
equal to zero otherwise. The executive ratio (Exeit-j,t) is calculated as ExecuComp SALARY + all other
annual compensation (SUMOTH), divided by total current compensation (SALARY+BONUS) + all other
annual compensation (SUMOTH) for each year. Data are at firm level, as I sum the salary, all other annual
compensation, and total annual compensation for all the executives in the company for each year. For j=1,
it’s the average of the executive ratio over the two-year period, and for j=2 it’s the average of the executive
ratio for the company for the three-year period. NumEstit-j,t, finally, is the number of analyst that are
following the company throughout the year, that I adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher number
in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts following it, but
from the number of good/bad news about the company future earnings.
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel A Audit opinion

X it / Pit −1 = α 0 + α1Dit + β 0 Diff it + β1Code1it −1 + β 2 Diff it * Dit + β 3Code1it −1 * Dit
+ β 4Code1it * Diff it + β 5Code1it −1 * Diffit * Dit + β 6 NumEstit
(1)LAD Code1 vs. Code4
-0.015576
(12.00)**
0.000119
Diff
(3.35)**
-0.005365
Code1
(4.45)**
0.000227
Diff*D
(4.49)**
-0.00088
Code1*D
(0.51)
-0.000112
Code1*Diff
(2.49)**
0.000105
Code1*D*Diff
(1.65)
-0.000326
NumEst
(4.34)**
0.069289
Constant
(72.50)**
17656
Observations
0.036
Pseudo R Square
D

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Where:
The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market
value for year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings before
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of
equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share,
Compustat DATA199). Diffit is the difference between the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the
downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call
database). Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit-j,t, finally, is the
number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.
Audit opinion codes are:
0. Financial statements are unaudited
1. Unqualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect no unresolvable restrictions and auditor has no
significant exceptions as to the accounting principles, the consistency of their application, and the
adequacy of information disclosed
2. Qualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect the effects of some limitation on the scope of the
examination or some unsatisfactory presentation of financial information, but are otherwise
presented fairly. We assign this code when a company is in the process of liquidating (even if
opinion is not actually qualified) or when an opinion states that the financial statements do not
present fairly the financial position of the company
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3.
4.

5.

Disclaimer of or No Opinion. Auditor refuses to express an opinion regarding the company’s
ability to sustain operations as a going concern
Unqualified Opinion With Explanatory Language. Auditor has expressed an unqualified opinion
regarding the financial statements but has added explanatory language to the auditor’s standard
report
Adverse Opinion. Auditor has expressed an adverse

Columns (1) reports the results of the LAD regression for companies that received an auditor opinion code
1 vs. code 4 at time t-1. No company in the sample report a code equal to 3 or 5, and there are only 4
observations for companies receiving an audit opinion code 2 and 7 observation for companies with
unaudited financial statements (code 0).
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel B Auditors’ Going Concern Opinion

X it / Pit −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit + β 0 Diff it + β1GCOit + j + β 2 Diff it * Dit + β 3GCOit + j * Dit
+ β 4GCOit * Diff it + β 5GCOit + j * Diff it * Dit + β 6 NumEstit
(1) One Year Lag (2) Contemporaneous
(j=-1)
(j=0)
-0.017657
-0.017113
D
(10.28)**
(10.32)**
0.000115
0.000116
Diff
(2.97)**
(3.11)**
-0.350510
-0.381728
GCO
(21.88)**
(22.32)**
0.000127
0.000130
Diff*D
(2.10)*
(2.23)*
0.222471
0.023430
GCO*D
(9.05)**
(1.11)
-0.017224
-0.021131
GCO*Diff
(20.93)**
(3.40)**
0.041935
0.026000
GCO*Diff*D
(27.47)**
(4.18)**
-0.000420
-0.000423
NumEst
(3.25)**
(3.40)**
0.061399
0.061391
Constant
(46.65)**
(48.38)**
6282
6282
Observations
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

(3) One Year Ahead
(j=+1)
-0.017428
(10.28)**
0.000119
(3.10)**
-0.065795
(1.56)
0.000119
(1.99)*
-0.300983
(6.71)**
0.006607
(1.91)
-0.007147
(2.06)*
-0.000428
(3.35)**
0.061214
(47.19)**
6282

Where:
The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market
value for firm i in year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings
before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market
value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per
share, Compustat DATA199). Diffit is the difference between the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of
the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call
database). Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit, is the number
of analyst that are following the company throughout the year. GCOit+j, from the database Audit Analytics
between 2000 and 2005, is equal to 1 if the firm i received a going concern opinion from the auditors: (1)
one year before (j=-1), (2) the same year (j=0), or (3) will receive a going concern opinion the next year
(j=+1), zero otherwise.
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel C Big7

X it / Pit −1 = α 0 + α1 Dit + β 0 Diffit + β1BigX it + β 2 Diffit * Dit + β 3 BigX it * Diff it
+ β 4 BigX it * Dit + β 5 BigX it * Dit * Diffit + β 6 NumEstit
LAD Big7
-0.017185
D
(20.15)**
0.000132
Diff
(2.94)**
-0.010895
BigX
(11.35)**
0.000153
Diff*D
(2.21)*
-0.000085
BigX*Diff
(1.81)
0.002531
BigX*D
(2.89)**
0.000147
BigX*D*Diff
(2.00)*
-0.000322
NumEst
(5.05)**
0.074802
Constant
(78.31)**
17656
Observations
0.039
Pseudo R Square
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Where:
BigX includes the following audit firms: Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers & Lybrand
Deloitte in the United Kingdom since April 29, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse
on July 1, 1998), Ernst & Young (Ernst & Whinney from July 1, 1979 to September 29, 1989; Ernst and
Ernst prior to July 1, 1979), Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte, Haskins & Sells prior to December 4, 1989;
Haskins & Sells prior to May 1, 1978), Peat, Marwick, Main (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell prior to April 1,
1987) (known as KPMG internationally), and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Price Waterhouse prior to July 1,
1998 merger with Coopers & Lybrand). The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by
the beginning of the period market value for firm i in year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile
values. It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market
value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding,
Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199). Diffit is the difference between the sum
of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for
firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call database). Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, equal to zero
otherwise. BigX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was audited by one of the big 7 audit firms the
previous year, 0 otherwise. NumEstit, finally, is the number of analyst that are following the company
throughout the year. Column (1) reports the results of the estimation of the model for companies with one
of the Big 7 auditors at year t-1 vs. all the other companies in the sample.
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel D Auditors from Compustat DATA149
Code

Auditor

0

Unaudited

1

Arthur Andersen

2

Arthur Young (prior to October 1, 1989) (merged with Ernst & Whinney on October
1, 1989)
Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte in the United Kingdom since April
29, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse on July 1, 1998)

3

4

# Obs.
19
2299
0
939

8

Ernst & Young (Ernst & Whinney from July 1, 1979 to September 29, 1989; Ernst and
Ernst prior to July 1, 1979)
Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte, Haskins & Sells prior to December 4, 1989; Haskins &
Sells prior to May 1, 1978)
Peat, Marwick, Main (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell prior to April 1, 1987) (known as
KPMG internationally)
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Price Waterhouse prior to July 1, 1998 merger with
Coopers & Lybrand)
Touche Ross (merged with Deloitte, Haskins & Sells on December 4, 1989)

9
10
11

Other
Altschuler, Melvoin, and Glasser
BDO Seidman (Seidman and Seidman prior to September 1, 1988

115
0
118

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Baird, Kurtz, and Dobson
Cherry, Bekaert, and Holland
Clarkson, Gordon
Clifton, Gunderson
Crowe Chizek
Grant Thornton
J.H. Cohn
Kenneth Leventhal
Laventhol and Horwath
McGladrey & Pullen (McGladrey, Hendrickson, and Pullen prior to May 1988)

3
0
0
0
0
144
0
0
0
19

22
23
24
25
26
27

Moore Stephens
Moss Adams
Pannell Kerr Forster (Pannell, Kerr, MacGillivray in Canada)
Plante and Moran
Richard A. Eisner
Spicer and Oppenheim
Missing value

5
6
7

4232
2995
2614
3784
0

2
2
3
0
6
0
3907
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